Differences on responsibility continue in the 15th Global Stocktake negotiation

The second iteration of the Global Stocktake text is currently very long, with many points bulleted or posed as “no-text” options. Moving into the 9th Informal Session on the GST or the 15th including Joint Contact Group sessions, country Parties were instructed to suggest “surgical edits” before the text is handed over to the Presidency.

At first glance the text seems to include many key factors as optional. This would mean that Parties either agree to them or they get removed completely from the final text. 

Most concerning is paragraph 35, which speaks about fossil fuel phaseout. One of the options in this paragraph speaks to a phaseout of fossil fuels with a vague timeline of the “midcentury”. 

Another option speaks to the phaseout of coal by 2030 and an immediate stop to new unabated coal generation. This singling out of coal has long been contentious particularly from India and China. India’s surgical edits included a suggestion to remove paragraph 35. 

Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) referred to the paragraph as “trauma” and preferred the ‘no text’ option. Russia and Iran said that natural gas is a bridging fuel and necessary for transition.

It is unacceptable to not have a timeline for the phaseout of oil and gas as clear as the one for coal. Additionally, the paragraph only speaks to reducing the “use” of fossil fuels and not their production, leaving out accountability from developed countries like the United States, the world’s top oil producer. The only silver lining to this paragraph is that it calls for a “phaseout” and not a “phasedown”. 

A key paragraph under mitigation speaks to recognising that a significant part of the global carbon budget has been utilised before 2019. Developed countries including the US and Australia do not want such references to historical emissions, including the optional paragraph on Kyoto Protocol failures.

Under the same section is a paragraph recognising that current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) will lower emission levels by 5.3 per cent by 2030 compared to 2019 levels, if all conditions are met. 

The US said it will accept this paragraph if the following line is deleted – “depends mostly on access to enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity building support” – essentially deleting records for the responsibility of the Global North in aiding mitigation in the Global South. 

In adaptation, the acknowledgement that doubling adaptation finance is just a starting point was brought up first by the Group of 77 and China and LMDC with the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). In the second iteration, this paragraph has been kept as a no-text option and references to the need for more adaptation finance were challenged by the developed side. 

Japan “strongly requested” to move all adaptation finance mentions to means of implementation. 

Paragraph 58 notes that “estimated costs / needs of adaptation are now approximately 10–18 times as much as international public adaptation finance flows”, a number from the 2023 Adaptation Gap Report published by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The US and Australia suggested this line be removed. 

In means of implementation, differences arose over the paragraphs on Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, which speaks to aligning financial flows with low carbon development. There are worries that 2.1c can be misused to direct where money should go and what does or does not constitute “low carbon” development in the Global South. 

The African Group of Negotiators stressed that on the proposal of an Article 2.1c Work Programme from developed countries, the language must reflect that there is no agreement on this yet. The EU stressed that the Article 2.1c Work Programme is extremely important while saying that the Technology Implementation Programme and Capacity Building fund proposed by the G77 and China are not. 

Other notable interventions included Brazil and China, who stressed the importance of highlighting risks from unilateral trade measures, possibly referencing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism recently launched by the EU. 

Russia and Saudi Arabia on behalf of the LMDC opposed language on “human rights” in the text. India maintained a position that there should be no policy prescriptive mandates in the GST text. 

A final round of negotiations is expected on December 6, following which the text will be handed over to the Presidency by the co-facilitators. It is unsure whether a third iteration of the text will be published before this.